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There are currently twelve Eastern and Central European countries that have made formal application to join NATO. As a result of the Madrid Conference in July, 1997, invitations were only extended to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. These invitations were clearly proffered out of both political and military necessity after more than seven years of diplomatic soul searching by the current NATO members.
Although Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are eagerly looking forward to joining NATO next year, they will initially be unable to fulfill their commitments as fully contributing partners. Significant problems exist in force modernization, interoperability, training programs, NCO development, and English language proficiency. The Madrid Conference was the first step in a long and arduous journey, that will hopefully culminate in the achievement of full partnership for these fledgling candidate nations. When they are admitted to NATO next year, it will not be on a equal footing with current members (which could take as much as 15-20 years) . The transition from old Soviet style militaries to a much higher NATO standard of performance will not be complete when these countries sign the North Atlantic Treaty.
Once the welcome ceremonies are over the struggle to achieve full partnership will begin for NATO's newest members.
The road that they must now travel will be expensive both in the expenditure of political capital and national treasure.
These new member states must now earnestly design and execute viable plans and procedures that will gain them acceptance into NATO as fully capable members. The true measure of their success will be a significantly enhanced European security environment.
They must be able to adequately support Article 5 (an attack against one is an attack against all) of the NATO charter and effectively contribute to the out of area operations that will continue to appear on NATO's agenda well into the next millenium.
The timetable for meeting the accession protocols is very aggressive and calls for the acceptance of these countries as members by NATO's fiftieth anniversary in April, 1999 . This goal may be politically possible but will realistically prove to be unachievable both in the defense planning process and NATO's integrated military structure. The present low levels of unit baseline collective task proficiencies indicate that a period of at least 15-20 years will be required to achieve an acceptable NATO standard. Individual task proficiency is relatively high towards the end of a conscript's period of service, but his unit's ability to execute collective tasks is highly perishable.
The result is adequately trained individuals/small units and units larger than company size that are unable to execute more complex collective tasks. However, all three of these newly invited states have participated to a great extent in the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). Fortunately, these efforts have allowed them to make initial adjustments in terms of interoperability with NATO forces and has exposed them to NATO's standard operating procedures.
OBSTACLES
The key hurdles to overcome on the way to full membership are leaving PfP behind, ratification of the Protocols, modernization, establishment of professional military structures, interoperability, and deployment capabilities that can quickly bring these forces to bear in future hotspots. Some other challenges facing these candidates will be: English language training, development of a career NCO corps, and enhanced capabilities to host the reception of NATO reinforcements (similar to the current Hungarian support to SFOR in Tzar, Hungary).
Under the umbrella of NATO force planning, which provides an analysis of structure requirements, the new members will have to meet targets in accordance with NATO Force Goals that are based on Ministerial Guidance. Additionally, they will be required to complete their performance evaluation in the form of the annual Defense Planning Questionnaire based on target force goals. Whatever the outcome of the cost analysis, it will be more important to answer the question -is it worth it? Age-old arguments about burden-sharing will surface and it is clear that there will be no free ride for the new members. By holding the Russians closer through the PJC it will be like two boxers embracing in the ring (neither able to throw a punch).
There are however worries that this consulting relationship will potentially lead to Russia exercising excessive influence in the affairs of the NATO members. These fears should be set aside by a strong North Atlantic Council that does not allow a broadening of the PJC focus and influence in key strategy policy debates. 10 Whatever measures are taken, Russia's reaction will continue to be a source of great concern to the Alliance. Currently the Russian focus is necessarily on the domestic scene -this will not always be the case. The eventual recovery of the Russian economy will surely promote greater interest in what might potentially be seen as an enlarged and threatening NATO on the border.
MILITARY REFORMS
Efforts to modernize the militaries of these candidate nations will obviously be closely linked to the cost debate. The old Soviet equipment, structure and doctrine will require extensive overhaul to meet NATO standards. All three of these countries have begun to modernize but Poland has set itself on a model course of action to achieve these objectives. The Poles have established a fifteen year modernization plan which will initially be guided, in its execution, by a detailed five year defense budget estimate and a, "...general forecast of military expenditure in the following decade." 11 Key modernization areas addressed in their planning are: combat equipment, force structure, command and control, improved operational readiness, and rapid reaction units readily available for deployment. Also included in the package will be improvements to basing and reception structure required to support the staging and follow on deployment of NATO reinforcements. 12 As noted by the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, "We must continue the reform and modernization of the military, achieving further progress in interoperability and compatibility. " 13 Pledges to modernize will not be enough, the effort will require an enormous amount of funding that will probably not be forthcoming in the near term. Cash that is available will in all likelihood be used to bolster the emerging capitalist market economies that are being established in Eastern Europe.
Domestic production of war related items will be minimal, "Although the ECE [East Central European] states produce some weapons and support vehicles on their home soil, they will need to acquire a fair amount of equipment from abroad. This especially is the case for modern combat aircraft, which will dominate the cost of modernization programs." 14 The purchase of these required items of equipment from Western sources will be at relatively expensive prices. In light of the fact that these countries do not have deep enough pockets to purchase this equipment, it will be "provided" by the NATO membership in the form of loans and contributions to the overall cost of expansion.
Eventually, the standard NATO methods of determining each member's burden sharing will determine the new members level of fiscal expenditures.
The SFOR mission in Bosnia has provided an excellent opportunity for all three candidates to get on course with standard NATO operating procedures. Serious equipment incompatibilities and deficiencies have been highlighted as a result of working shoulder to shoulder with these countries in a real world mission. Not surprisingly, communications gear has been a major area of concern that will require expensive modernization to become compatible with NATO, particularly in the area of encryption and decryption devices for sensitive information. Technical training for both operators and maintainers will be required to bring these countries up to speed in all relevant signal related areas.
Command and control (C2) will be directly linked to each military's ability to communicate not only with its' own forces but more importantly with fellow coalition partners. Current levels of sophistication in this area are woefully lacking and dangerously inept. The future conflicts that will confront NATO require decentralized leadership that is able to control decentralized execution of mission type orders. The platoon commander of the future must be able to act quickly based on his mission and understanding of his commander's intent (a radical departure from the Soviet style of command and control). In the case of these new members, the U.S. Army's "crawl, walk, and run" method of training may be the best and most simple route to success. This methodology is a three-part framework for training that ensures a uniform understanding of the task, conditions, and overall performance standards. Although it seems simple enough, most of the frustrations encountered in a combined environment are directly related to misinterpretations of the task to be performed. Thanks to active participation in the PfP program these newly invited members are already at high levels of the "crawl" phase. They at least understand the task to be performed, the conditions under which they must perform the task, and the standard that they must be able to achieve. The difficult part of this training methodology is moving quickly through the walk phase and to be able to sustain a "running" level of task execution over the long haul. This will be particularly difficult as long as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary continue to rely heavily on short periods of conscription to fill their ranks. The learning curve can only be dampened by sustainment training and retention of well trained soldiers, NCOs, and officers.
The first PfP peacekeeping exercise in the U.S. (Cooperative Nugget) was conducted with platoon size organizations from eighteen countries in the summer of 1995, at Fort Polk, LA. The tasks to be performed at the squad/platoon level were basic, fairly straight forward, and easily understood by the participants. They were all able to move to the "walk" phase with relative ease and only encountered problems when they hit the "run" or full up phase of training. The areas requiring improvement in the culminating FTX were for the most part related to the lack of sufficient interoperating experience among the participants in collective training tasks. These deficiencies were evident to the participants and served to reinforce the necessity and value of frequent integrated training at all levels. No amount of visiting training teams and instruction can substitute for the value of collective training that is enhanced and honed to a keen edge by challenging combined exercises.
The exercise drove home the point that achieving top-notch execution will take years of hard work and combined training.
Additionally, most American participants had difficulty displaying a great deal of patience and perseverance in working with many of these countries. The fact that it was not easy for some participants to move to the "run" level of task execution was a source of great frustration to many American players in the exercise. Our fellow European allies are more understanding in this regard and we should learn to take their lead in this area.
Combined training with NATO's newest members will be a fact of life for the U.S. military and overcoming our own cultural impatience will be the key to our success in these endeavors. 
CONCLUSION
The way ahead for both NATO and its potential new members is clearly fraught with many problems and yet unresolved issues.
The deficiencies discussed in this paper will initially prevent Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary from fulfilling their commitments as fully contributing partners. Near term efforts will not replace the need for a long-term program (15-20 years) aimed at achieving a high level of interoperability and performance capability. These challenges are not insurmountable but will require both diligent and patient efforts on the part of all concerned parties, supporting a new role for NATO in the security of Europe. The raison d'etre of the cold war has evaporated and the "Russian bear" is at best no longer a threat or at worst just currently dormant. Whatever the case with respect to Russia, Europe must gird itself for potential security threats wherever they may emerge on the continent or out of area.
An expanded NATO with fully contributing partners will be required to effectively execute the new post cold war strategy.
The recent and ongoing situation in Bosnia provides clear and irrefutable evidence that NATO must be involved early in the resolution of problems in violent hotspots. In the case of Bosnia the price for delayed action was the massacre of innocents, who in many ways were the victims of both their indigenous enemies and the largesse of the Western powers.
Security related problems will continue to directly effect the economic arena as well. Stability is the key to economic prosperity and must be guaranteed by a collective security 20 instrument -in this case NATO. This fact is blatantly obvious to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary (not to mention the other nine applicants for NATO membership). They have all realized that a credible security framework must be established to support the secure environment needed to build a vibrant market economy. These market economies are currently at the fragile beginning stage in the process of replacing the old inefficient command economies of the communist era. The economic maturation process is stifled by lingering concerns about the stability of the region; these worries can only be overcome by the embrace of a newly enlarged NATO.
A newly expanded NATO is the logical means to the desired endstate of a prosperous and stable Europe. The consensus is building to support this notion and in time NATO will become the guarantor of this emerging environment. Clearly, all of the obstacles in the road to full partnership for NATO's newest members will not be overcome or removed in the next year. The greater European security need is met however by the near term inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Removal of the obstacles will take years of integration and training but in the meantime, the Alliance will be able to travel this new road to a more secure Europe. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will proudly take their places at the NAC (North Atlantic
